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ABSTRACT
In March 2011,  President Obama issued 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness  that began a new  chapter in 
the intent and scope of preparedness. To 
better understand the current policy,  this 
article  first chronicles  the decade of 
refinement in preparedness – from  its 
definition to  its  guidance – and then 
describes  a number of emerging policy 
themes. It identifies  policy concerns  for 
federal policymakers  to  consider as  the 
national preparedness  strategic  direction 
continues to advance.  These concerns  are (1) 
the operational approach to  meeting a 
n a t i o n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s  g o a l ; ( 2 ) 
implementation of capabilities  by the “whole 
community”—from  the federal government 
to individual citizens—to address  the 
“maximum  of maximums” threats; (3) the 
inclusion of slowly emerging threats as 
p r i o r i t i e s  f o r a c t i o n i n n e a r - t e r m 
preparedness  strategies; and (4) federal 
control over other governmental levels  in the 
national interest.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2011,  President  Obama  issued 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness.  Its issuance and resulting 
implementation documents affirmed existing 
policy  crafted under  President  George W. 
Bush,  but the directive began  a  new  chapter 
in  the intent and scope of preparedness. 
Preparedness goals, risk assessment, tools, 
programs,  and results expected from  them 
experienced,  to a greater  or  lesser  extent, 
major refinements. To better  understand the 
current policy, this article  first chronicles the 
decade of refinement  in  the definition  of 
national  preparedness, its doctrines,  and 
guidance from  early  framing  under  President 
Bush  to the modifications made under 
President Obama.
Building  on  this history,  the article 
describes a  number  of emerging  policy 
themes and identifies policy  concerns for 
federal  policymakers to consider  as the 
national preparedness strategic  direction 
continues to advance. These concerns are (1) 
the operational  approach  to meeting  a 
n a t i o n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s g o a l ; ( 2 ) 
implementation of capabilities by  the “whole 
community”  – from  the federal  government 
to individual citizens – to address the 
“maximum  of maximums”  threats; (3) the 
inclusion  of slowly  emerging threats as 
p r i o r i t i e s f o r  a c t i o n  i n  n e a r - t e r m 
preparedness strategies; and (4) federal 
control  over  other  governmental levels in  the 
national interest.  At  bottom,  these policy 
concerns have a  common root: whether the 
resources spent  on  the readiness efforts were 
worthwhile.  Going  forward,  more realistic 
assessment of threats and preparedness 
capabilities and the identification  of a  proper 
balance of responsibility  sharing  seem  in 
order.  In addition, appropriate measurement 
a p p r o a c h e s m a y  w e l l b e f o u n d i n 
management  system  standards already  in 
existence.
PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE 
FORMATIVE YEARS
After  the September  2001  terrorist  attacks, 
the federal  government raised terrorism  as 
the primary  domestic  threat. Major  policies 
developments,  the creation of a  new  domestic 
security  department,  and the issuance of a 
specific national homeland security  strategy 
reflected the criticality  of the threat. In  June 
2002,  President  Bush  released Securing the 
Homeland: Strengthening the Nation. 1  The 
president called the terrorist  threat  a 
permanent  national condition  and homeland 
security  a  new  national  calling. The 
document  previewed the first  homeland 
security  national strategy,  intended to be the 
national blueprint  for  confronting  terrorism 
and that  called for  the federal government to 
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partner  with  other  levels of government,  the 
private sector,  and citizens. In  another 
document, the president  presented the 
organizational  structure at  the federal level 
considered best suited to meet  the terrorism 
threat: the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). 2 The Homeland Security  Act  of 2002 
(P.L. 107-296) subsequently  authorized the 
new department.
In  July  2002, the Office  of Homeland 
Security  issued the first  National Strategy 
for Homeland Security. 3  The Strategy 
defined homeland security  as “a  concerted 
national effort  to prevent terrorist attacks 
within  the United States,  reduce America’s 
vulnerability  to terrorism,  and minimize the 
damage and recover  from  attacks that  do 
occur.” 4  Terrorism  prevention,  vulnerability 
reduction,  and minimizing damage and 
recovery  were set as homeland security’s 
strategic  objectives. This initial definition  of 
preparedness carried over  during the 
subsequent  decade. Prevention  meant  action 
at  home and abroad to deter, prevent,  and 
eliminate terrorism.  Reducing vulnerability 
meant  identifying  and protecting  critical 
infrastructure and key  assets, and detecting 
terrorist  threats and augmenting defenses, 
while balancing  the benefits of mitigating  risk 
against economic costs and infringements on 
individual liberty.  Response and recovery 
focused on  managing the consequences of 
attacks and building  and maintaining  the 
financial, legal, and social systems to recover.
THE OVERARCHING GOAL AND POLICY 
AND OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
S t a r t i n g i n  e a r l y  2 0 0 3 ,  t h e B u s h 
Administration  began  issuing  a number  of 
directives and guidance,  thereby  accelerating 
the formation  of a  national  preparedness goal 
and supporting  policy  and operational 
system.  In  February  2003,  the president 
issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 requiring  a  National  Incident 
Management System  (NIMS) and a  National 
Response Plan.5  The Homeland Security  Act 
of 2002  also required the consolidation of 
existing  federal government  emergency 
response plans into a single national 
response plan. DHS issued the National 
Response Plan in  December  2004,6  which 
was subsequently  replaced by  the National 
Response Framework in January 2008.7
President  Bush’s December  2003  issuance 
of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8 (HSPD-8) emerged as the major  policy 
development  for  national preparedness.8 
HSPD-8 crafted homeland security’s strategic 
position  as national preparedness for  all 
major events – terrorism, major  disasters, 
and other  domestic  emergencies. It  defined 
preparedness in  terms of planning, 
operations,  and equipment  at  all  levels of 
government  to prevent, respond to,  and 
recover  from  major  events. The directive 
mandated a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal,  established mechanisms 
to advance federal delivery  of preparedness 
assistance to other  governments, and 
described actions to further  improve federal, 
state, and local entity preparedness.
The national preparedness goal was the 
critical policy  requirement in  HSPD-8. The 
goal was to establish  measurable readiness 
priorities and targets, with  the caveat  that 
they  balance the potential threat  and 
emergency  events with  resources. Readiness 
metrics, standards, and a  system  to assess the 
nation’s overall  preparedness to respond to 
major  events emphasized actual  results. 
There was an  emphasis on  assessing  response 
in  comparison  to the objectives of prevention 
and recovery. The fiscal year  2005  DHS 
appropriations legislation  (P.L.  108-234) 
established a statutory  requirement for 
implementing  HSPD-8. The legislation  called 
for nationally  accepted first  responder 
preparedness levels by  January  31,  2005, 
state and local adoption  of national 
preparedness standards in fiscal year  2005  as 
part of federal grant  guidance guidelines,  and 
issuance of national preparedness goal final 
guidance by March 31, 2005.
DHS met the March  2005  deadline with 
the Interim  National Preparedness Goal.9 
DHS stated the Interim Goal enabled the 
nation  to answer: “How  prepared do we need 
to be?”  “How  prepared are we?”  and “How  do 
we prioritize efforts to close the gap?”  The 
Interim  Goal identified fifteen  national 
planning  scenarios and a  target  capabilities 
list  (to accomplish  necessary  preparedness 
tasks in  a  universal  task list)  as two planning 
tools.  The scenarios, issued earlier  in  2004  by 
the Homeland Security  Council, described 
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plausible terrorist  attacks and natural 
disasters intended to stretch  the nation’s 
prevention  and response capabilities for 
events such  as a  nuclear  detonation, 
pandemics,  chemical  and biological attacks,  a 
major hurricane or  earthquake, and a  cyber 
attack.  Collectively,  the scenarios identified a 
complete array of preparedness needs. 10
The target capabilities list identified what 
was necessary  to carry  out critical operations 
and tasks in  response to a  major  disaster  or 
catastrophe based on  the combined planning 
scenarios.  It  was derived from  a  universal 
task list  intended to respond to the planning 
scenario events.  For  example,  an  incident 
management  task included the coordination 
of transportation operations. The Interim 
Goal stated that  such a capability  was to 
provide the means to accomplish  one or  more 
tasks under  specific  conditions and to specific 
performance standards. It  also reflected 
national preparedness as a  continuous cycle 
of activity  to develop the necessary  elements, 
such  as plans, policies,  and equipment,  vital 
to maximize capabilities. The target 
capabilities list set forth  a  set of essential 
capabilities, stated as necessary  in  whole or 
in  part  by  various levels of government to 
carry  out  certain  tasks to prevent, protect 
against, respond to,  and recover  from 
terrorist  attacks and major  disasters. Further, 
the Interim Goal included a  number  of 
national priorities, such  as implementing 
NIMS and the National Response Plan.
The Interim  Goal results were intended to 
be national,  not purely  federal  products,  but 
clearly  governmental. However,  efforts would 
be needed by  all levels of government  and 
between  government and private-sector  and 
nongovernmental organizations to identify 
threats, determine vulnerabilities, and 
identify  required resources,  all part of 
capabilities-based planning and operations.
IMPLEMENTING THE PREPAREDNESS 
GOAL AND FURTHER GOAL UPDATES
With  the issuance of the Interim  Goal, 
implementing  guidance took center  stage, 
expected to solidify  the use of capabilities-
based planning  and related tools. Initial 
guidance was included in  fiscal  year  2005 
homeland security  grant program  guidance. 11 
In  April 2005, the DHS issued the National 
Preparedness  Guidance. 12  This document 
provided a  more detailed explanation  of the 
content and use of capabilities-based 
planning  that  was to support  achievement of 
the interim  goal, including  the national 
planning  scenarios, the universal task list, 
and the target capabilities list.  It  also 
expanded on  the national  priorities, 
standards and strategies for  preparedness 
assessments of capabilities, and included a 
timeline for  HSPD-8  implementation. 
Hurricane Katrina  exposed a  number  of 
preparedness gaps, so Subtitle C of the Post-
Katrina  Emergency  Reform  Act  of 2006 (P.L. 
109-295) continued the call  for  immediate 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f t h e H S P D - 8 
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  a d d i n g  t o t h e 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f c a p a b i l i t i e s 
development because of legislative mandates.
F i s c a l y e a r  2 0 0 6  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s 
legislation  (P.L. 109-90) called for  DHS to 
issue a  final  national preparedness goal by 
the end of December  2005.  That month, DHS 
issued a  new  draft of the National 
Preparedness  Goal.13  This draft  Goal 
presented the achievement of capabilities as 
the central feature in  the road from 
prevention  to recovery  from  domestic 
incidents.  The draft expanded attention  on 
minimizing  the impact of major  events such 
as was experienced during the major 
hurricanes of 2005.  The DHS defined the 
goal as “to achieve and sustain  risk-based 
target  levels of capability  to prevent, protect 
against,  respond to,  and recover  from  major 
events, and to minimize their  impact on  lives, 
property, and the economy, through 
systematic and prioritized efforts by  federal, 
state, local and tribal  entities, their  private 
and non-governmental partners,  and the 
general  public.” 14 As was the case with  the use 
of target levels of capability  in  the definition 
of the goal, the definition  of preparedness 
was stated as “the range of deliberate,  critical 
tasks and activities necessary  to build, 
sustain, and improve the operational 
capability  to prevent,  protect  against, 
respond to,  and recover  from  domestic 
incidents.” 15  The draft  called again  for  the 
collective efforts at  all levels of government 
and between  government  and private sector 
and nongovernmental  organizations in  a 
collective effort.
CAUDLE, NATIONAL STRATEGIC POSITION  3
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOLUME 8, ARTICLE 11  (AUGUST 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
The December  2005  draft Goal further 
delved into the specifics of preparedness. 
Operationally,  for  example, it  meant 
establishing guidelines, protocols, and 
standards for planning, training  and 
exercises, personnel  qualification and 
certification,  equipment  certification,  and 
publication management. The draft  Goal 
reiterated previous policy  and guidance that 
the target  capabilities list  would be the 
primary  source of readiness metrics. 
Standards to assess national preparedness 
collectively  would be found in  the goal and 
the capabilities-based planning tools,  such  as 
the national  planning scenarios and the 
target capabilities list.
In  September 2007,  DHS updated the 
national preparedness goal  and its guidance 
in  the National Preparedness Guidelines.16 
The Guidelines  contained four  critical 
elements.  One was the national  preparedness 
vision, which  the Guidelines  called a  concise 
statement  of the nation’s core preparedness 
goal for  the nation: “a  nation prepared with 
coordinated capabilities to prevent,  protect 
against,  respond to, and recover  from  all 
hazards in  a  way  that  balances risk  with 
resources and need.” 17  Other  elements were 
the national planning  scenarios; the universal 
task list  of some 1,600 unique tasks to 
prevent, protect  against, respond to, and 
recover  from  the major events represented by 
the national  planning  scenarios; and the 
target  capabilities list containing  thirty-seven 
specific capabilities that  communities,  the 
private sector,  and the levels of government 
should collectively  have for  effective disaster 
response.
The DHS stated that the publication of the 
Guidelines  actually  finalized the national goal 
and its related preparedness tools.  The new 
Guidelines  retained a  capabilities-based 
approach  to organize and synchronize 
national efforts in and investments for 
prevention,  protection, response and 
recovery. The Guidelines  also incorporated 
lessons learned from  Hurricane Katrina and a 
2006  review  of states’ and major  cities’ 
emergency  operations and evacuation  plans. 
Readiness metrics remained a  feature of the 
national goal, although  specific  metrics and 
standards remained under development.
A NEW NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY
In  October  2007, the Homeland Security 
Council issued a  new  National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. 18 While the first  strategy 
identified terrorism  as the central threat, the 
2007  Strategy  reflected better  understanding 
of terrorist threats and additional risks, what 
it  called the full range of potential 
catastrophic events, including  natural 
disasters,  infectious diseases,  and man-made 
accidents. While the Strategy  said that 
effective preparation for  catastrophic natural 
disasters and man-made disasters was not 
homeland security  per  se, 19 such  preparation 
could increase homeland security.
Consistent  with  earlier  policy  documents, 
the Strategy  presented the bedrock principle 
of a  culture of preparedness and partnership 
that  would share  responsibility  for homeland 
security  across the entire nation  – local, 
tribal, state,  and federal governments, faith-
based and community  organizations,  and 
businesses. Further,  its four objectives 
remained consistent with  earlier  policies: (1) 
prevent and disrupt  terrorist  attacks; (2) 
protect  the American  people,  critical 
infrastructure,  and key  resources; (3) 
respond to and recover  from  incidents that 
do occur; and (4)  continue to strengthen the 
foundation  to ensure long-term  success.  The 
fourth  objective was targeted directly  at 
homeland security  management. The 
Strategy  consistently  stated the importance 
of capabilities to anticipate and handle 
incidents and the need to create and 
institutionalize a  comprehensive homeland 
security  management  system  incorporating 
all stakeholders.
The new  Strategy directly  discussed the 
establishment  and institutionalization  of a 
c o m p r e h e n s i v e H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y 
Management System  that  would build on  the 
planning  and operations detailed in  the 
National  Preparedness Guidelines. The 
System  was to have activity  in  the four  phases 
of (1) guidance (presidential directives and 
other key  policies); (2) planning (family  of 
strategic,  operational and tactical  plans); (3) 
execution of operational  and tactical level 
plans; and (4) assessment  and evaluation  of 
both operations and exercises.
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In  sum, under  President Bush,  combating 
terrorism  within the United States was seen 
as a t ru ly  nat ional ,  not a  federa l , 
responsibi l i ty ,  a l though  the federal 
government  assumed control  of policy  and 
strategy  development,  buttressed with  federal 
grants to states and localities.  In  line with  a 
managing  for  results philosophy, homeland 
security  was to have specific  goals, 
performance targets, and performance 
measures. The emergency  management 
structure would continue its traditional  role 
of anticipating  the aftermath  of any  attack  or 
emergency.
PRESIDENT OBAMA AND 
STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENTS
The change of administrations after  the 2008 
national election  marked a  confirmation  of 
but  continued refinements in national 
homeland security  policies and strategies. 
Shortly  after  taking  office,  President  Obama 
initiated a  study  to examine the organization 
of the White House to deal with  homeland 
security  and counterterrorism.  He stated 
“Homeland Security  is indistinguishable  from 
National Security  – conceptually  and 
functionally,  they  should be thought of 
together  rather  than  separately.”20 The result 
was a new  national security  staff no longer 
divided between  national  security  and 
homeland security. 21 In  February  2010, DHS 
r e l e a s e d t h e l e g i s l a t i v e l y  r e q u i r e d 
Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review 
Report. 22  As was the case with  earlier 
policies,  the Report called for  a  national 
framework of collective efforts and shared 
responsibilities to build and sustain  critical 
homeland security  capabilities. The grave 
security  environment  (beyond terrorism) 
identified in  the Report clearly  supported a 
broader  security  stance: it  was expected that 
violent  extremist  groups would use terrorism 
to attack United States targets, social and/or 
political instability  would continue,  health 
threats would be more difficult  to prevent, 
technological developments and cyber  threats 
would pose threats,  climate  change would 
increase weather-related hazards,  multiple 
simultaneous crises were likely,  and 
complacency  would be a  danger as major 
crises receded from memory.
President  Obama released a  new  National 
Security Strategy that  reflected the 
homeland security  policies and concepts 
identified in  the Quadrennial Review 
Report.23  The Strategy  emphasized that  the 
traditional distinctions between  homeland 
and national  security  was no longer 
appropriate.  The Strategy reaffirmed the 
“whole of government”  approach,  which  is 
the need for  all levels of government, if not 
the entire country,  to strengthen  national 
preparedness.  The Strategy  retained the 
earlier  policy  notions of a  homeland security 
enterprise (federal,  state,  local, tribal, 
territorial,  nongovernmental,  and private-
sector  entities, as well as individuals,  families 
and communities sharing  a  common  national 
interest in  American safety  and security) and 
a culture of preparedness.
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 8
The 2010  Quadrennial Review  Report and 
the newer  National Security Strategy  set  the 
stage for  a  restatement  and revitalization  of 
the presidential direction  for  national 
preparedness.  President  Bush’s 2003 
HSPD-8,  which had been  codified by 
Congress, was replaced by  President Obama’s 
March  2011  Presidential Policy Directive 8 
National Preparedness  (PPD-8).24 The new 
directive reaffirmed past policies and 
direction.  PPD-8 stressed the need for 
systematic preparation  for  the greatest risk, 
the shared preparedness responsibility  from 
government  to the citizen  (“all-of-Nation”), 
and a  capabilities-based approach  to 
preparedness. The directive stipulated the 
development of (1)  a  national  preparedness 
goal  identifying the core capabilities 
necessary  for preparedness and (2)  a  national 
preparedness system  guiding  activities 
enabling the nation  to achieve the goal. 
National preparedness was defined as actions 
taken  to plan, organize, equip,  train, and 
exercise to build and sustain  the capabilities 
necessary  to prevent, protect  against, 
mitigate the effects of,  respond to,  and 
recover  from  the threats posing  the greatest 
risk to the nation’s security.
PPD-8  required that  a  new  national 
preparedness goal  address specific threats 
and vulnerabilities.  This overtly  reduced 
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reliance on  national planning scenarios 
issued several  years earlier  as yardsticks to 
measure preparedness capabilities. The goal 
was to define the core capabilities necessary 
to prepare for  incidents posing  the greatest 
risk  to the nation’s security.  This made 
concrete the new  policy  emphasis on 
maximum  capacity  for  any  major  disaster  or 
c a t a s t r o p h e t h a t w o u l d e m e r g e i n 
implementation efforts.
The directive also mandated a  new  piece 
to the national preparedness system  – 
planning  frameworks for  each  of the five 
preparedness objectives – from  prevention  to 
recovery. It was envisioned that  each 
planning  framework would include a  basic 
plan  to address all-hazards. There would be 
roles and responsibilities at  the federal level, 
but  annexes would address unique 
requirements for  particular  threats or 
scenarios. The directive also required a 
“ c a m p a i g n ”  t o b u i l d a n d s u s t a i n 
preparedness . This would integrate 
community-based, nonprofit,  and private 
sector  preparedness programs,  research  and 
development  activities, and preparedness 
assistance.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPD-8
The DHS has issued a  flurry  of documents in 
response to PPD-8’s mandates. In  May  2011, 
DHS issued the Implementation Plan for 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness.25  The Implementation Plan 
clarified that PPD-8’s reference to “all-of-
Nation” was the same as “whole community,” 
or  the participation  of the private and 
n o n p r o f i t  s e c t o r s ,  i n c l u d i n g 
nongovernmental organizations,  and the 
general  public. The DHS was to perform  a 
strategic,  national-level risk  assessment 
applicable to national,  regional,  and local 
levels. The assessment would help identify 
where core capabilities and associated 
performance objectives for  the entire 
homeland security  community  should be 
placed,  building  the maximum  preparedness 
capacity  needed to respond to a  catastrophic 
event.
Thus, the whole community  is to develop 
core capabilities for incidents posing the 
greatest  risk  to the nation’s security. FEMA 
administrator  Craig  Fugate described the 
change as planning  for a  “meta-scenario”  (or 
“maximum  of maximums”)  disaster.  This was 
a  worst-case scenario based on different 
hazards that challenges preparedness and 
overwhelms the response capabilities of every 
governmental level.26  The scenario, a  no-
notice event,  contemplated the impact area of 
at  least 7  million  population  and 25,000 
square miles,  and involving  several states and 
FEMA  regions. It  results in  190,000 fatalities 
in  its initial hours,  with  265,000  citizens 
requiring emergency  medical attention. 
There i s severe damage to cr i t i ca l 
infrastructure and key  resources, including 
transportation.  The fiscal  year  2011  Regional 
Catastrophic  Grant Program  guidance used 
the meta-scenario to promote preparing  for  a 
catastrophe where extraordinary  levels of 
mass casualties, damage, and disruption 
overwhelm  traditional and well-established 
government  response and recovery  plans and 
procedures.
In  September 2011, DHS issued the 
National Preparedness  Goal First Edition. 27 
The new  Goal included detailed tables with 
core capabilities for  prevention  through 
recovery  (called mission  areas) and their 
preliminary  targets. For  example,  prevention 
capabilities included planning,  public 
information and warning,  operational 
coordination,  forensics and attribution, 
intelligence and information  sharing, 
interdiction  and disruption,  and screening, 
search,  and detection.  Each  capability  was 
described; to illustrate, interdiction  and 
disruption is to delay, divert, intercept,  halt 
apprehend, or secure threats and/or hazards.
The document  made clear that  these core 
capabilities presented an  evolution  from  the 
voluminous target capabilities list  developed 
in  response to HSPD-8. The core capability 
targets would be the performance thresholds 
for  each  core capability  and the basis to 
develop performance measures to evaluate 
progress in  meeting  the targets.  The 
description of the core capabilities and their 
preliminary  targets were significantly 
streamlined from  the task and capability  lists 
i ssued in  response to HSPD-8 and 
subsequently  tied to federal homeland 
security  funding. While still prescriptive,  it 
appears the notion  was that streamlining 
should create more room  for  members of the 
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homeland security  community  to craft 
capabilities tailored to local  and regional 
considerations, as well as the national 
interest.
The Goal stated that  a  strategic  national 
risk assessment  should confirm  the need for 
an  all-hazards,  capability-based approach  to 
preparedness planning. The DHS December 
2011  unclassified Strategic National Risk 
Assessment grouped threats and hazards into 
national-level events to test the nation’s 
preparedness. 28  These included natural, 
technological/accidental, and adversarial/
human caused threat and hazard groups:
Natural Animal disease outbreak,  earthquake, flood, human  pandemic 




Biological  food contamination, chemical substance spill or  release, 
dam failure, radiological substance release.
Adversarial or 
Human-Caused
Aircraft  as a  weapon,  armed assault,  biological terrorism  attack 
(non-food), chemical/biological  food contamination  terrorism 
attack,  chemical terrorism  attack (non-food), cyber  attack against 
data,  cyber  attack against  physical infrastructure,  explosives 
terrorism  attack, nuclear  terrorism  attack, radiological  terrorism 
attack.
The Goal did not address slowly  emerging 
threats or  drivers of threats such  as climate 
change identified in  the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review  Report. This was 
purposeful.  The unclassified Strategic 
National Risk  Assessment said it evaluated 
the risk from  known threats and hazards. 
Those events,  it  noted, had a  distinct 
beginning  and end and were clearly  linked to 
homeland security  missions.  Thus, political, 
economic,  and environmental,  and societal 
trends possibly  contributing  to a  risk 
environment but  not national events for 
homeland security  were excluded from  the 
assessment. Nevertheless, the document said 
non-national-level  threats,  such as droughts 
and heat waves,  could pose risks to 
jurisdictions and should be considered in 
preparedness planning.
In  November  2011,  DHS released a  brief 
description of a  new  National Preparedness 
System. 29  Its components included (1) 
identifying  and assessing risk,  (2) estimating 
capability  requirements, (3)  building  and 
sustaining capabilities,  (4) planning to 
d e l i v e r c a p a b i l i t i e s , ( 5 ) v a l i d a t i n g 
capabilities, and (6)  reviewing  and updating. 
To identify  and assess risk, the System 
document stated that the Strategic  National 
Risk  Assessment would analyze the greatest 
risks to the nation.  The Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk  Assessment guidance 
under  development  at  that  time would 
provide a  common, consistent  approach  to 
identify  and assess risks and associated 
impacts.
Measuring progress toward achieving the 
National Preparedness Goal could be done 
through  tools such as exercises,  remedial 
a c t i o n  m a n a g e m e n t p r o g r a m s , a n d 
assessments.  The National Exercise Program 
was deemed the principal mechanism  to 
measure readiness, supplemented by 
exercises done by  individual organizations. 
Training  and performance during actual 
events would test  and validate achievement 
of desired capabilities.  Ongoing  sharing  of 
lessons learned and monitoring also would 
occur  through  a  remedial action management 
program  and a  comprehensive assessment 
system  of the whole community.  A  National 
Preparedness  Report  was targeted for 
November 2012.
On March  6,  2012,  the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency  (FEMA) released draft 
national framework documents for  comment. 
The working  drafts included the National 
Prevention Framework,  the National 
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Protection Framework ,  the National 
Mitigation Framework,  and the National 
Response Framework. These documents 
briefly  described factors such  as stakeholder 
roles and responsibilities and coordinating 
structures to deliver  core capabilities. The 
J a n u a r y  2 0 0 8  N a t i o n a l R e s p o n s e 
Framework  will  be superseded once the new 
framework is finalized. Comments on  the 
drafts were due to FEMA no later  than  April 
2, 2012. FEMA  had already  released the 
National Disaster Recovery Framework  in 
September  2011. This framework  replaced 
the existing  National Response Framework’s 
Emergency  Support Function #14—Long 
Term  Community  Recovery.30  FEMA  also 
released a  draft  of the Recovery Interagency 
Operational Plan  intended to implement the 
already  published National Disaster 
Recovery Framework. The detailed draft 
specifically  covered items such  as the concept 
of operations for  federal recovery  support  to 
stakeholders and maintaining readiness.
CONCERNS IN STRATEGY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION
In  sum, national preparedness has been  the 
subject  of a significant  amount of Presidential 
and Congressional attention and direction 
since September  2001. Perhaps lost  in the 
detail is a  number of broad policy  themes 
running through  the refinement  in  the 
national preparedness strategic direction  to 
this point in time. These include:
• Homeland security  – previously  a 
domestic focus – is placed within  national 
security.  The federal government, 
particularly  the Federal  Emergency 
Management Agency,  is established as the 
lead for  national preparedness policy  and 
guidance.
• Preparedness is defined with  the full 
coverage of objectives: prevention, 
protection,  mitigation, response, and 
recovery, with  response and recovery  no 
longer the centerpieces of preparedness.
• The full range of potential  catastrophic 
events,  including natural disasters, 
infectious diseases, and man-made 
accidents join  terrorism  as the focus for 
homeland security.  Known  threats with  a 
distinct  beginning  and end are central to 
homeland security  risk management  and 
preparedness. Slowly  emerging  threats 
are not an initial emphasis. 
• Maximum  capacity  for  a  catastrophic 
event  (a meta-scenario) is set  as the 
benchmark for  preparedness,  replacing  a 
more generic “major  disaster”  on  a  local 
or regional level.
• The whole homeland security  community 
has the responsibility  to protect  national 
interests and way  of life, anticipating  that 
all  levels of government  will be initially 
overwhelmed. Core capabilities and 
targets for  a  national effort update  past 
prescriptive,  detailed individual tasks and 
target capabilities.
• A  homeland security  management  system 
detailed to accomplish  homeland security 
and crafted with  planning frameworks, 
p e r f o r m a n c e e x p e c t a t i o n s , a n d 
a s s e s s m e n t  a n d a d j u s t m e n t 
requirements. Measurable readiness 
priorities and targets to be developed and 
assessed,  primarily  through  exercises and 
actual events.
National preparedness policy  certainly  is 
not static: refinements will  continue as the 
newer  national preparedness directives and 
operational  guidance are implemented and 
others are issued.  There are three concerns 
that  federal policymakers might consider  as 
the national  preparedness strategic  direction 
continues to advance.  These are (1) the 
operational  approach  to meeting a  national 
preparedness goal; (2) implementation of 
capabilities by  the “whole community”  – 
from  the federal government  to individual 
citizens – to address the “maximum  of 
maximums” threats; and (3) the inclusion of 
slowly  emerging  threats as priorities for 
action in near-term preparedness strategies.
ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT 
CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT 
APPROACH
T h e c u r r e n t a n d e a r l i e r  n a t i o n a l 
preparedness goals and their  implementing 
documents,  as well  as federal legislation, 
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have identified the need to build and sustain 
specific preparedness capabilities for  the 
entire homeland security  community. 
Federal, state,  and local  governments, 
nongovernmental organizations,  private 
organizations,  and the general public are that 
community.  National preparedness comes 
from  capabi l i t ies across this whole 
community.  The DHS in  large part adopted 
the capabilities approach  (used by  the 
defense community  in  many  countries)  from 
the Department of Defense.31  HSPD-8 
required a  national preparedness goal  to 
define measurable  readiness (preparedness) 
priorities and targets,  but  also with  a  caveat 
about  the resource investments.  PPD-8 called 
for  actions to achieve a  preparedness 
approach  to optimize the use of available 
resources.
Developing capabilities may  have been  the 
optimal route at that time toward achieving 
preparedness, but  whether other  alternatives 
that  were better  investments were considered 
was not  made explicit – if,  in  fact,  they  were 
even  considered. The DHS has provided 
billions in  preparedness grants intended to 
aid states, urban  areas, tribal  governments, 
and nonprofit  organizations,  supposedly  to 
strengthen  their  capabilities to meet  threats 
associated with  potential  terrorist attacks and 
other hazards.  Over  time, the department  has 
attempted to link dollars spent  with  the 
development of capabilities.32
However,  whether this approach has been 
or  will be successful  is unclear,  as assessing 
preparedness based on  national preparedness 
capabilities remains very  elusive. Summing 
t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s , t h e G o v e r n m e n t 
Accountability  Office (GAO) found that 
evaluation  efforts that collected data  on 
national preparedness capabilities faced 
limitations such  as data  reliability  and the 
lack  of standardized data  collection.33 
According  to GAO, FEMA had problems in 
completing a  comprehensive assessment 
system  and developing national preparedness 
capability  requirements based on established 
metrics. The GAO continues to cite  these 
operational  and implementation  weaknesses, 
even  though  the assessment  of capabilities 
and evaluation of preparedness is a  legislative 
requirement. 34  Concerns have also surfaced 
in  the defense community  regarding 
measuring  capabilities and their  results.  For 
example, an article in  2007  described 
significant ambiguity  in  the definition of 
capability  and its use.35  In a  similar  vein, 
another report  in  2011  stated that  no one had 
been  able to adequately  create analytical tools 
t o q u a n t i f y  c a p a b i l i t y  t o c o m p a r e 
effectiveness with “units of capability.” 36
In  addition,  GAO specifically  found 
problems with  at least  one tool  mentioned by 
the new  National Preparedness Goal as 
central  to measuring progress – the National 
E x e r c i s e P r o g r a m .37  T h e F E M A 
implementation of the national program  has 
run  consistently  into problems, such  as 
ensuring  that  federal and state governments 
addressed deficiencies identified by  the 
exercises.  In  March  2011, FEMA  developed a 
new  National Exercise Program  Base Plan 
that  extensively  revised the program, with 
major  changes in  requirements and 
leadership. 38 The verdict is still out  whether 
the past  history  of the DHS in  failing to 
adequately  measure progress will be 
reversed.
Thus, still  left  unanswered is the most 
significant question: What preparedness did 
the billions of dollars buy? With  federal 
funding constraints and similar  challenges 
for  other  levels of government  and other 
members o f the homeland secur i ty 
community  for  the foreseeable future, this is 
an  opportune time to consider  if other  policy 
options might be more cost  effective or, at  a 
minimum,  justify  the current policy  of 
capabilities development and sustainability.
The capabilities approach is not  etched in 
stone. There is at  least  one policy  option the 
federal  policymakers might  consider to 
contrast  with  the capabilities approach. This 
option  is grounded already  in  Congressional 
legislation  and administration  policies. 
Simply,  it  is the application  of national  and/
or  international  management system 
preparedness standards useful  for  all 
organizations. This approach  has been 
advocated in the past. 39
Two national  voluntary  programs use 
management  system  preparedness standards, 
not elusive core capabilities, as the 
benchmark for  preparedness requirements. 
Legislation  implementing  many  of the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendations (Section  524 
of the August  2007  P.L. 110-53) called for 
DHS to create a  voluntary  private sector 
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preparedness program  with  standards, 
including  accreditation  and certification 
processes.  In  June 2010,  DHS produced the 
Private Sector  Preparedness Accreditation 
and Certification  Program  (PS-Prep).  Three 
management  system  standards were 
approved for  adoption  in  the program: ASIS 
SPC.1-2009  Organizational Resilience: 
Security Preparedness,  and Continuity 
Management System; British  Standard 
2 5 9 9 9 - 2 : 2 0 0 7  B u s i n e s s  C o n t i n u i t y 
Management; and National  Fire Protection 
Association  1600: 2007/2010 Standard on 
Disaster/ Emergency  Management and 
Business  Continuity Programs.  At the end of 
September  2010, DHS announced a 
certification  program  tailored to the needs of 
small business.
T h e o t h e r  n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t  u s i n g 
management  system  standards is the  current 
Emergency  Management  Accreditation 
Program  (EMAP),  a  voluntary  review  process 
for  state and local emergency  management 
programs. EMAP certifies government 
programs against  standards directly  based on 
NFPA  1600. State and local  entities can  use 
federal  homeland security  grant  funding to 
pay  for  EMAP activities.  Interestingly, at one 
time, FEMA used the EMAP standards to 
administer  its National  Emergency  Baseline 
Capability  Assurance Program. If there truly 
were to be a  “whole of community”  effort, it 
would seem  to be a necessary  condition  to 
have a compatible approach  for  all the 
entities involved.
Still to be resolved would be whether 
adoption of the management  system 
preparedness standards should be mandated, 
perhaps t ied to federal funding or 
regulations,  and how  certification  or 
accreditation  against  the standards would be 
conducted. Normally,  management system 
standards such  as those under  the PS-Prep 
program  or  EMAP are voluntary, although 
compliance with  such  standards may  be seen 
as part  of a  legal standard of care across an 
industry.
Government agencies such as DHS could 
implicitly  mandate standards by  using  them 
as guidelines for  complying  with  regulatory 
requirements. Or  the agencies may  forego a 
mandatory  regulation  if they  view  voluntary 
compliance as meeting policy  goals. This 
seems to be the legislative and executive 
branch  approach  taken  with  the PS-Prep 
voluntary  standards for  the private sector. 
Established provisions can be invoked for 
mandatory  adoption  as part  of national 
regulatory  frameworks or  legislation.  The 
N a t i o n a l T e c h n o l o g y  T r a n s f e r  a n d 
Advancement  Act  of 1995  and resulting  Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular 
A-119  (revised in  1998) mandated that  federal 
agencies use management system  standards 
developed by  either  domestic or  international 
standards bodies instead of federal 
government-unique standards (e.g.,  the 
National Preparedness Goal) in  their 
regulatory or procurement activities.
To date, DHS has not publicly  addressed 
how  the management  system  standard 
voluntary  program  is to be reconciled, if at 
all, with building  and sustaining  core 
capabilities.  At  a  minimum,  metrics 
identified as part  of implementing  the 
National  Preparedness Goal should be 
compared to those in  PSPrep and the EMAP 
standards. 
IMPLEMENTING WHOLE COMMUNITY 
EFFORTS FOR THE MAXIMUM OF 
MAXIMUMS
A  s e c o n d c o n c e r n  i s r e a l i s t i c a l l y 
implementing  a  whole community  effort in 
anticipation  of a  maximum  of maximums 
effort. In June 2011  testimony, FEMA 
Administrator  Fugate stated that emergency 
management  historically  planned for 
scenarios to which  government could 
respond and recover  from.40 He testified that 
modern  disaster planning  should be for  a 
“ m e t a - s c e n a r i o ” ( o r  “ m a x i m u m  o f 
maximums” event)  destined to overwhelm  all 
levels of government. Such  worst-case 
planning  would require the efforts of a  whole 
community  approach  intended to leverage 
the expertise and resources of governmental 
and non-governmental stakeholders—the 
entire emergency  management  community 
from  the federal government to individuals, 
families, and communities.  This philosophy 
was further  defined in  FEMA’s A Whole 
Community Approach to  Emergency 
Management: Principles, Themes,  and 
Pathways for Action.41
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The emphasis on  shared responsibility  and 
coordination  in  the whole community 
concept reaffirms past  policies.  President 
Bush’s June 2002  proposal  to create DHS 
expressed hope that the agency  would make 
state, local, and private sector  coordination 
one of its “key  components.” 42  The 2002 
National Strategy for Homeland Security 
viewed homeland security  as a  concerted 
national effort.  The approach  was based on 
shared responsibility  and partnership 
involving  the Congress, state and local 
governments, the private sector, and the 
American  people in  a  concerted national 
effort to prevent attacks. 43
The draft  national planning frameworks 
are very  general  in  their  discussion  of the 
roles and interactions of the whole 
community  to achieve capability  targets and 
what scarce resources practically  can  be 
expected for investment. Presumably,  explicit 
guidance will await  finalization  of the 
National Preparedness System  and the 
p l a n n i n g  f r a m e w o r k s a n d t h e i r 
implementation  plans. For  example, the 
National Disaster  Recovery  Framework  and 
the draft  Recovery Interagency Operational 
Plan are explicit  in  terms of requirements 
and hierarchy, but  not  the practical issue of 
funding and the sharing of resources within 
and across stakeholders from  the government 
to the individual citizen.
However,  is it  realistic  to root  whole 
community  preparedness in anticipation  of a 
truly  mega-disaster  scenario? A  mega-
disaster  is a  very  high bar for the initial  and 
ongoing  investment in  preparedness core 
capabilities defined in  the National 
Preparedness  Goal and draft  national 
planning  frameworks. All homeland security 
actors must anticipate and be ready  for  a  “no-
notice”  catastrophe much more severe than 
virtually  all past major  disasters in the United 
States, including  Hurricane Katrina, the 1964 
Alaska  earthquake and tsunami,  or  the 1993 
eastern  and central superstorm.  A  mega-
disaster, under FEMA’s criteria, would be 
akin  to “no notice”  devastating  earthquakes, 
tsunamis,  and volcanic eruptions that  killed 
or  injured hundreds of thousands and leveled 
cities. A  nuclear  event  in  a  major urban  area 
or  a fast-moving  worldwide pandemic also 
would overwhelm  immediate response and 
recovery for a good length of time.
It is not clear how  the federal  government 
can  direct and pragmatically  facilitate  the 
crafting  and sustaining  of capabilities across 
the whole community  necessary  for  a  mega-
disaster  with  these levels of devastation  going 
forward. Preparing for a  mega-disaster 
appears to run  counter  to the professed 
emphasis on  risk management  and setting 
priorities for  preparedness,  not  a  worst-case 
scenario for  the  entire nation  to anticipate.  It 
well  may  be that emergency  managers will 
actually  scale the requirements to a  more 
convincing  expectation. For  example, 
Northeast  emergency  managers have posited 
the following possible mega-disasters:44
• A  6.5  earthquake striking  a  heavily 
populated urban  area causing  billions of 
dollars in damage and killing hundreds,
• A  category  3  hurricane making  landfall 
over  Long  Island, NY and tracking  up 
through  New  England killing  hundreds 
and causing billions of dollars in damage.
• An F5  tornado striking  a  heavily 
populated area killing  a  thousand people 
and causing  hundreds of millions in 
damage.
• A  major  blizzard hitting  the Northeast 
during  a  heavy  rush  hour  commute with 
over  fifty  inches of snow  and hurricane 
force winds causing  billions of dollars in 
damage along  the coast,  widespread 
extended power  outages and stranding 
thousands.
EMERGING THREAT PRIORITIES
A  third concern in  the strategic direction  is 
addressing threats that are slowly  emerging 
as a  direct  threat to national security.  Among 
other  things,  the September  2010 Local, 
State,  Tribal,  and Federal Preparedness Task 
Force report  to Congress called for  (1) 
improving  the ability  to strategically  forecast 
emerging  preparedness requirements and 
associated policies and/or  capabilities and (2) 
develop a strategic policy  planning process 
that  prepares for  future challenges by 
performing  long-range assessments.45  The 
Task Force said that the complexity  of the 
envisioned homeland security  and emergency 
management  enterprise, especially  in terms 
of non-governmental roles,  means that 
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desired preparedness outcomes often  may 
take years to achieve.  In  their  view, a  range of 
dynamic  issues – such  as the environment, 
demographics,  economics,  and health  trends 
– are likely  to play  increasingly  important 
roles. Preparedness policies,  therefore, 
should be anticipatory,  not  reactionary, 
enabling  anticipatory  investments in  key 
areas.
As mentioned earlier,  the hazards listed in 
the National Preparedness Goal reference 
well-known, specific event  hazards and 
attacks determined by  the current  Strategic 
National Risk Assessment.  However, the 
current  National Security Strategy  and 
Quadrennial Homeland Security  Review 
Report explicitly  define a  strategic threat 
environment  and global trends that appear  to 
have national preparedness implications, 
although  they  are not described as imminent. 
These include the gradual  emergencies and 
disasters that  result  from  dependence upon 
fossil fuels,  global climate change,  fragile and 
failing  states,  and global illicit trafficking  and 
related transnational crime,  and economic 
and financial instability.
A  2009  article on  national  security 
strategies presented drivers of changes in 
security  on a  national  and global  scale,  such 
as pandemics,  population  changes,  and 
economic  stress.46  These drivers translate 
into threats to security,  whether  individually 
or  collectively,  which countries have 
incorporated into their  strategies. In  other 
countries, the security  environment  includes 
these longer-term  threats. In general, their 
national security  strategies (including those 
covering homeland security  or  domestic 
security) incorporate them  into the strategies 
and follow-on policy  and operational 
requirements and guidance. For  example, 
climate change or environmental change pose 
dangers that may  occur  on  a national or 
global scale,  such as more frequent  heat 
waves, droughts,  flooding, reduced crop 
yields, and wildfires.47
The National Preparedness Goal and 
supporting  documents target  building and 
sustaining  capabilities narrowly  for  the near 
term  threat of a  meta-scenario. It  is not  clear 
how  these capabilities will  prepare the 
country  for  the challenges of the longer-term, 
slowly  emerging threats.  Certainly  past 
history  is informative: flooding  and famines 
because of drought  and crop failure have 
killed millions worldwide.
There have been  a multitude of studies on 
t h e s e d r i v e r s o r  c h a n g e s w i t h 
recommendations for  immediate action.  The 
Organization  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and 
Development (OECD) presented an  analysis 
of “global  shocks”  – cascading risks that 
become active threats as they  spread across 
global systems. 48 These included pandemics, 
financial  crises,  critical infrastructure 
disruption,  and cyber  risks,  geomagnetic 
storms, and social unrest. As the OECD study 
pointed out,  surveillance is central to risk 
assessment and management.  In  addition, 
security  agencies,  working  with  regulatory 
agencies, should use, adapt, and implement 
risk-assessment  tools to design  more resilient 
national and international systems. 
Emergency  management  of future global 
shocks,  OECD said,  called for  policy  options 
such  as (1)  surveillance and early  warning 
systems, (2) strategic  reserves and stockpiles 
of critical resources,  (3) addressing where 
countermeasures to systemic threats have 
been  weak,  and (4) monitoring  of future 
developments that  could pose potential  risks. 
OECD cited challenges such  as insufficient 
skills and knowledge to manage global  shocks 
and obstacles to international cooperation 
and coordination.
The DHS certainly  understands the need 
for  action anticipating these global  shocks. 
The FEMA  Strategic  Foresight  Initiative, 
initiated in  2010,  emphasizes the importance 
of understanding and addressing  the drivers 
of future change.49  The FEMA  urges the 
emergency  management  community  to 
establish  a  foresight capability  – identifying 
key  future  issues, trends,  and other  factors 
with  an eye to executing  an agenda for  action 
over  the next  twenty  years. Not surprisingly, 
FEMA  identifies well-known  drivers – 
universal  access to and use of information, 
technological  innovation and dependency, 
shifting US demographics, climate change, 
global interdependencies and globalization, 
government  budget  constraints, critical 
infrastructure deterioration,  and the evolving 
terrorist  threat. The FEMA  study  says that 
through  the foresight  process,  over  the next 
few  decades,  very  rapid change and 
complexity  will  define the emergency 
management  environment.  FEMA  says that 
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even  slow-moving  and predictable  trends 
such  as demographic changes could be 
radically  changed because of drivers such as 
climate change or pandemics.
FEMA  sees a  number  of emergency 
management  capabilities as needed as part  of 
strategic  foresight  that  could be included in 
preparedness efforts.  For  example, these 
i n c l u d e a d d r e s s i n g d y n a m i c  a n d 
unprecedented shifts in local and regional 
population  characteristics and migratory 
flows; anticipating  emerging challenges and 
d e v e l o p i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e p l a n s a n d 
contingencies; employing  alternative surge 
models to meet  the challenging confluences 
of social,  technological,  environmental, 
economic, and polit ical factors and 
conditions; and remediating hidden 
vulnerabilities in  critical supplies from  water 
to energy  to medical products to offset 
threats to the full scope of emergency 
management activities.
FEDERAL CONTROL OVER OTHER 
GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS FOR THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST
A  fourth area  of concern that overarches the 
other three is the stated importance and 
needed leadership of the whole homeland 
security  community  and the actual federal 
control  over  other  levels of government.  An 
article discussing  federalism  and homeland 
security  noted that  the September  2001 
terrorist  attacks created a  high  demand for 
national  homeland security  policy  and 
action.50 The many  federal homeland security 
directives,  mandates,  and grant compliance 
requirements have framed and centralized 
control  of the national homeland security 
agenda,  even  if there was collaboration in  the 
development with  selected state and local 
officials. Hurricane Katrina  presented 
another opportunity  for  an  expanded federal 
government  role in  disasters because of the 
failures of individual agencies and weak 
intergovernmental collaboration.
As a  result,  it  is difficult to find the 
appropriate balance between  federal  control 
over  the national  interest and its objectives 
and local flexibility  and discretion  under 
federalism. The homeland security  links 
between  the broadened national security 
strategy  and national  preparedness goal  and 
then  state and local  support  depend on  state 
and local  implementation  of the national 
direct ion. At  present ,  the National 
Preparedness  Goal and its supporting 
documents have limited language about  state 
and local flexibility  and the meeting  of 
specific and direct  state and local interests. 
The streamlining of lists of core capabilities 
and their  preliminary  targets is encouraging, 
but  federal approval  of state and local 
implementation will be the proof if state and 
local jurisdictions can  craft capabilities 
responsive to their  needs as well as what  is 
seen as the national interest. This will  be a 
continuing  concern  as budget  decisions 
consider  fiscal austerity  and the funding 
needed to build and sustain  preparedness 
capabilities for a mega-disaster.
CONCLUSION
The September  2010 Local, State, Tribal,  and 
Federal Preparedness Task Force report 
commissioned by  Congress underscored the 
importance of preparedness as a  major  policy 
agenda,  but  also warned of the central 
difficulty. The Task Force determined, 
The basic tenets of preparedness…are 
relatively  uncontroversial  within both the 
emergency  management discipline and 
homeland security policy. What has 
c h a n g e d i s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t 
preparedness can  be only  as  effective as the 
goals  and priorities  for readiness. The 
challenge is  determining what our 
readiness goals and priorities should be, 
from which preparedness activities  are 
subsequently derived and then  measured 
against.51
Over  the past  decade, the federal 
government  has done much  to determine 
national preparedness or  readiness goals and 
priorities.  In  the next  decade of homeland 
security  as part  of national  security,  the 
t h r e a t  e n v i r o n m e n t – t h e s e c u r i t y 
environment  – is somewhat known,  but also 
uncertain. New  threats may  emerge and 
others wane. The larger  social and economic 
environment,  such  as fiscal austerity  and 
demographic  changes create instability  in 
what can, and should be done. 
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PPD-8  emphasizes the vital role of 
preparedness in  protecting  the nation, its 
people, its vital interests, and its way  of life. 
Preparedness on the part  of all members of 
the homeland security  community  in this 
national endeavor should be done in  ways 
that  emphasize the principles of clarity, 
sustainability,  integration,  balance,  and 
accountability.  This article suggests that 
federal  policymakers,  in  concert  with  others 
with  preparedness responsibilities, should 
consider  refinements in  a  number  of 
fundamental policy  areas that  are  in  line with 
these principles. 
Preparedness expectations to meet  all 
threats – whether  imminent or  slowly 
emerging  – should be clear.  Common  sense 
s h o u l d r e i g n . E x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t 
sustainability  of funding  to meet  whole of 
community  preparedness for  a  mega-disaster 
must  consider  and then reflect  the reality  of 
funding – whether  from  governmental  or 
other  sources. Even apart  from  funding, 
preparedness principles and activities should 
be seamlessly  integrated into ongoing 
programs and business processes, such  as the 
adoption  of management system  standards. 
Balance should be applied in  assessing  the 
costs and benefits of preparedness and 
required capabilities and their  impact  on 
n o n - p r e p a r e d n e s s g o a l s . L a s t l y , 
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  c a l l s f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g 
preparedness accountabi l i ty  points , 
performance goals,  and measures reflective of 
the national  interest,  yet  also local flexibility 
and discretion within our federalist system.
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